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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
CHESTER G. VERNIER AND ELMER A. WILCOX.
ALIENS.
Helen Bugajewitz v. Louis Adams, 33 Sup. Ct. Reptr, 607. Constitution-
ality of act for deportation of immoral alien wome n. -The prohibition of U. S.
Const. art. 1, sec. 9, against ex post facto laws, has no application to provis-
ions like those of the act of Feb. 20, 1907, sec. 3, and the amendatory act of
March 26, 1910, sec. 2, for the deportation of alien women found practicing
prostitution after their entry into the United States.
APPEAL.
Ward v. State. Ind. 101 N. E. 809. Burden of showing prejudice. An ap-
pellant who complains of error preventing a fair trial must make an affirmative
showing a prejudicial error.
BANK REPORT.
State v. Sharp, Minn., 141 N. W. 526. Knowledge of Falsity. A statute
penalized the making of false bank'reports. It did not specifically make actual
knowledge of the falsity, or criminal intent, an essential ingredient of the of-
fense. A bank president was indicted for making a false report to the superin-
tendant of banks. The indictment did not allege that he knew the report was
false. On demurrer to the indictment it was held that the statute was a police
regulation which imposed a penalty irrespective of an intent to violate it. The
object was to require a degree of diligence for the protection of the public
which would render violation impossible. It was the duty of the president to
know whether his report was true or false. If it was false, though he did not
know it, he violated the statute. The ordinary rule of interpretation, that there
must be a criminal intent, does not apply to such statutes. To apply it would
almost destroy their effectiveness.
DISTURBANCE OF PUBLIC ASSEMBLAGE.
People v. Malone. 141 N. Y. Supp. 149. "Willful disturbance." Defendant,
a suffragette of education, attended a political meeting at which the candidate
of the Democratic national convention for President for the ensuing election
was to speak. During his address she arose from her seat and asked him to
state his position on woman suffrage. The speaker declined to *discuss the
question as a state issue, and because he was there only to discuss national
questions. She was requested by the chairman of the meeting to resume her
seat; but she remained standing, made a repetition of her request, and ad-
dressed a further question to the speaker relative to the same subject. The
meeting was thrown into an uproar, and accused was ejected and arrested.
Held that, while her acts prior to her being requested to resume her seat were
proper, her refusal to do so and her continuance to interrogate the speaker
constituted a "willful disturbance" of the public assembly, in violation of Penal
Law, section 1470.
ERROR PREJUDICIAL.
State v. Hutchison, Minn. 141 N. W. 483. Erroneous Instruction. The
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state proved that the defendant had passed a jewelry store several times in one
(lay, and had looked into the window; the store was broken into that night and
several watches stolen; defendant offered one of the watches for sale in an-
other town the next evening, saying that his sister had given it to him; he was
arrested the same evening and produced all the stolen watches, saying that he
had bought them from a stranger at the railway station in the town where they
were stolen; and that he had no money when arrested. Defendant adhered to
the story that he bought the watches; there was evidence that he might have
had money at that time; and there was strong evidence that he was a boy of
very good habits and character. The trial court charged in effect that unless
defendant's explanation of his possession of the watches was reasonable he
should be convicted. Held ihe question was not whether it was reasonable but
whether it was true. "An unreasonable story may be a true one, and reason-
able and plausible stories are often false ones." While the court hesitated to
reverse a conviction on errors in the instructions, or in the admission of evi-
dence, where the evidence of guilt is strong, it cannot itself try the defendant
and thus deprive him of his right to a trial by jury, and to have the evidence
weighed by a jury under instructions that are reasonably accurate and not mis-
leading. Defendant's guilt was not conclusively proven, and it is not clear that
the verdict would have been the same under proper instructions. Hence the
order denying the new trial was reversed.
ERROR WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
State v. Wilson, Ia., 141 N. W. 337. Errorless Instruction. In a trial for
murder the trial court charged the jury that when the killing is done with a
.edate, deliberate mind, and in pursuance of a design previously formed, the
presumption of malice is conclusive. The appellate court declined to approve
the instruction, as the presumption may be rebutted by proof that a killing
tinder such circumstances was in self-defense. But there was no evidence of
self-defense in this case, as the defendant denied that he killed deceased, hence
the error was not prejudicial. Under a statute requiring a decision without re-
gard to technical errors which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties,
the conviction was affirmed.
Swarta v. State, Okla. Cr. App., 120 Pac. 1029. Incompetent Evidence Ad-
initted. A prosecution. for statutory rape turned upon the age of the prosecuting
witness. Her parents testified to the date of her birth, making her under six-
teen, the statutory age of consent, at the time of the offense. Over the defend-
ant's objection the state was permitted to put in evidence an entry in the fam-
ily Bible corroborating this testimony. The entry had originally been made in
another Bible by a preacher. That Bible became wdrn out and the entries in
it were copied by another preacher into a new Bible, which was the one offered
in evidence. A witness for the defendant testified that about the time of the
offense the "prosecutrix had told him she would be eighteen her next birthday.
She denied making this statement. Held, it was error to admit the Bible record,
as that was secondary evidence, and the best evidence available and had been
introduced in the testimony of the prosecutrix's parents. But as the testimony
of the parents was positive, unshaken by a rigid cross-examination, and had not
been contradicted, its admission was not prejudicial to the substantial rights of
the defendant. "There is no doubt of his guilt of the-crime charged, and his
escape from punishment would be a miscarriage of justice." Hence under a
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statute providing "On an appeal the court must give judgment without regard
to technical errors or defects, or to exceptions which do not affect the substan-
tial rights of the parties." the conviction was affirmed.
EVIDENCE.
People v. Richardson, Cal., 120 Pac. 20. Testimony of Mother Incidentally
Bastardizing Child. Defendant was convicted of providing a drug with intent
to procure a miscarriage. The woman's testimony showed illicit relations with
the defendant from August, 1908, to May or June, 1909, indications of pregnancy
in March and April, 1909, administration of the drug by defendant in May, her
marriage to a third person in August, and the birth of a child in December,
1909. On appeal the defendant contended that as this testimony tended to prove
the illegitimacy of the child it could not be considered. Held that the rule pro-
hibiting such testimony does not apply to cases in which the legitimacy of the
child is not directly in issue. This testimony proved a motive for the commis-
sion of the crime with which the defendant was charged, it did not affect the
legal rights of the child. Further, most of the testimony was given without
objection, and the particular objection raised on appeal was not suggested at all
in the trial court.
tXTRADITION.
Prosecution for Crimes Not Named in the Extradition Papers. In the May
issue of this Journal Win. H. Baldwin discusses whether it is lawful in Penn-
sylvania to bring a man back into the state under the desertion act of 1903 and
then prosecute him under the old law of 1867, and concluded that it is not so.
An illuminating discussion of the same general principle will be found in In re
Flack, 88 Kansas 616, decided January 11, 1913, which overrules State v. Hall,
40 Kansas 338. The syllabus in the Flack case is: "A person charged in any
state with treason, felony or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be
found in another state, and who, on demand of the executive authority of the
state from which be fled, shall be delivered up and removed to the state having
jurisdiction of the crime, may there be prosecuted for crimes other than the one
specified in the demand for his delivery without first giving him a reasonable
opportunity to return to the state which surrendered him." The Hall case had
held that an alleged fugitive may be prosecuted "only for the offense for which
he was extradited until after he has had reasonable time and opportunity af-
forded him to return to the place from which he was extradited' Flack was
arrested in New York for forgery and brought back to Kansas, and while await-
ing trial eleven other prosecutions were instituted against him for false and
fraudulent entries on the books of his bank. He brought habeas corpus to dis-
charge him from custody as to the eleven cases not covered by the extradition
proceedings.-J. C. Ruppenthal, Twenty-third Judicial District, Russell, Kansas.
HOMIcIDE.
Killing in an Attempt to Commit a Felony. Where accused menacingly
pointed his gun at decedent's brother, and decedent attempted to interfere, when
accused turned his gun and immediately shot and killed decedent, and then
turned and shot the brother, inflicting a wound not fatal, the felony committed
on the brother by menacingly pointing the gun at him was distinct from the
homicide, and was within Penal Law, Sec. 1044, making a killing "murder in
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the first degree" when committed by a person engaged in the commission of or
in an attempt to commit a felony. (Cullen, C. J., and Hiscock, J., dissenting).
State v. Saxon, Conn. 86 At. 590. Mental Capacity. A requested charge in
a homicide case that if the jury find that the accused's mentality was very low,
and not as high in some departments as a child of six years old, "the jury
should acquit," was properly refused as not stating the proper measure of crim-
inal responsibility, in that it did not point out the departments in which the
mentality of accused must be inferior to that of a six year old child to relieve
him from criminal responsibility.
INDICTMENT AND) INFORMATION.
John Gund Brewing Co. v. U. S., 204 Fed. 17, Rev. St. Sec. 3242 (U. S.
Comp. St. 1901, P. 2094), makes it an offense for a person to engage in the
business of a wholesale liquor dealer without having paid the "special tax" pro-
vided by law. Held, that an indictment charging defendant with engaging in
the business of a wholesale dealer in malt liquors without having paid the tax
,vas not demurrable because the tax was not referred to as a "special tax" as in
the statute.
People v. Smith, I1. 101 N. E. 957. Variance, idems sonans, proof. The
variance between an indictment charging a crime against nature, and alleging
the Christian name of the victim to be "Rosetta," and the proof that her name
is "Rosalia," is fatal, and the question of variance need not be raised on the
trial to be available, since the proof shows a crime, if any, against a person
other than the one named in the. indictment.
The doctrine of idem sonans may not be invoked where an indictment
charges the name of the person injured to be "Rosetta," while the proof shows
that her name is "Rosalia."
People v. Rosen, N. Y. 101 N. E. 855. Habitual Criminal Act Construed.
Penal Law, Sec. 1020, provides that a person convicted of a felony, who has
previously been convicted in this state of any other crime or con-
victed of a misdemeanor after having been five times convicted of
a misdemeanor iq this state, may be adjudged in addition to any other
punishment, to be an habitual criminal. Section 1021 makes habitual criminals
subject to the supervision of every judicial magistrate of the county and of the
supervisors of the poor of the town where they may be found; and Code Crim.
Proc. See. 485a, makes it the duty of the court, on the conviction of a prison
offense, to ascertain by examination under oath before sentence whether such
convict has learned any trade, and other facts the causes of criminal conduct.
Held, that to justify a sentence as an habitual criminal it was necessary that the
indictment charge a prior conviction, and that defendant be convicted on such
charge; the information developed on examination before sentence not being
sufficient.
People v. Archibald, Ill. 101 N. E. 582. Abatement of Nuisance. Criminal
Code (Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 38), Sec. 221, enumerates certain acts which are
declared to be public nuisances, and See. 222 declares that whoever shall be con-
victed of erecting any such nuisance shall be fined for the first offense, and
every such nuisance when a conviction therefor is had in a court of record may
be abated by the sheriff by the order of the court at the expense of the de-
fendant. Held, that the abatement of a public nuisance under such section was
not a part of the punishment for the criminal offense, and hence a prosecution
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therefor was not limited to indictment under constitution, Art. 2, Sec. 8, requir-
ing an indictment where the punishment exceeds fine and imprisonment in the
county jail.
JURY.
State v.-Wilson, Ia., 141 N. W. 337. Duty to Follow Law and Evidence. A
jury were instructed, "The fact that you have power to'return a -'erdict finding
a lesser crime or acquittal is alone no excuse for using such power. The lower
conviction or an acquittal should not rest on the notion that you can do as you
please arbitrarily." Objection was taken on the ground that the jurors "are at
liberty to acquit at pleasure; that is exactly what they have a legal right to do."
Held that while they have the power to act arbitrarily, they have no right,
either legal or moral, to do so. They do have the right to say which of the
witnesses they will believe, and which they will not believe, and have a right to
disbelieve all of them. Whether they could be called to account if they did act
arbitrarily need not be determined, but in a prior case this court approved an
instruction that unless they followed the law as given by the court they would
be guilty of perjury.
JUVENILE COURT LAW.
Ex parte Powell, Okla. Cr. App., 120 Pac. 1022. Constitutionality.. A boy
under fourteen years of age pleaded guiilty to an information charging burg-
lary and was sentenced to two years in the State Training School. The statute
under which this was done had been repealed by the Juvenile Court Law. Kate
Barnard, State Commissioner of Charities and Corrections, applied for a writ
of habeas corpus to secure his discharge. It was contended that the Juvenile
Court Law was unconstitutional. After holding that the title of the act was
sufficient, and that the act did not interfere with the constitutional jurisdiction
of the district court, the court held that the legislature had power to enact the
law. The state has power to commit minors to juvenile institutions (1) as a
punishment for crime; (2) in quasi criminal proceedings, when the minor is
incorrigible and beyond domestic control, not for punishment but for reform
and moral training; (3) for care and guardianship, when the minor is vagrant
and destitute, or in some jurisdictions neglected, ill-treated and not properly
cared for by his guardian, appointed or natural. In the second and third classes
of cases the state acts as parens patriae. "The moment a child is born he owes
allegiance to the government of the country of his birth, and is entitled to the
protection of that government for his person, as well as his property." By
such a statute the legislature gives this protection.
LARCENY BY TRICK.
Bivens v. State, Okla. Cr. App., 120 Pac. 1033. Distinguished from Eni-
bezzlement. Jurisdiction. Prosecutor and defendant slept in the same room in
Texas. Prosecutor was anxious about his money, defendant said he would
hide it for him, and prosecutor gave it to defendant for that purpose. It was
to be returned the next day. Early the next morning 'they took a train into
Oklahoma. There defendant professed to have lost the money. When he was
arrested that evening he threw the pocketbook containing the money away, and
when it was picked up, claimed the money as his own. Held that the evidence
justifiea a finding that the defendant meant to steal the money when he re-
ceived it, rather than to keep it for and return it to the prosecutor, so that the
crime committed was larceny rather than embezzlement, under the Oklahoma
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statutes. While the larceny was committed in Texas, yet under a statute pro-
viding that any person who steals property in any other state or country and
brings the stolen property into Oklahoma may be convicted and punished as
though the larceny had been committed in Oklahoma, the defendant was prop-
erly convicted of larceny.
PLEA.
People v. Afton, Ill. 101 N. E. 557. Withdrawal and Re-entry. It being
apparent that the parties and the court considered and treated the overruling
of the motion to quash the indictment as a reinstatement of the plea, with-
drawn for the purpose of such motion, the trial having thereupon proceeded
without objection, formal re-entry of the plea was not necessary.
RAPE.
People v. Liedecker, IIl. 101 N. E. 556. Age; presumptions. Where, under
an indictment charging him with forcible rape, and averring that he was then
and there a male person of the age of 16 years and upwards, accused was con-
victed, but the verdict failed to find his 'age, it will be presumed on appeal,
there being no bill of exceptions, that accused was not a minor, and hence the
jury were not required to find his age: Act of June 18, 1891 (Laws of 1891,
p. 52), establishing a reformatory and requiring the jury to find whether the
defendant is between the ages of 10 and 21 years, applying only to minors-the
indictment merely charging that accused was 16 years of age or more.
SHERMAN ANTI-TRusT AcT.
United States v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 204 Fed. 107. "Engage in Con-
spiracy." The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, July 2, 1890, c. 647, Sec. 1, 26 Stat. 209
(U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 32C0), provides that every contract, combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states is illegal,
and that every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such
combination or conspiracy shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Section 2 declares
that any person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize, any part of the
trade or commerce within the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor. Held, that the phrase, "engage in such combination
or conspiracy," in Section 1, was used in a broad sense, and included, not only
such persons as initiated such a conspiracy, but also those who afterwards en-
gage therein; and hence an indictment, charging that defendants were engaged
in a conspiracy among themselves to control and monopolize interstate com-
merce in the manufacture and sale of coaster brakes among the several states,
followed by an allegation of overt acts tending to effectuate the conspiracy,
vas not defective for failure to charge directly the formation and existence of
the conspiracy, the words "engage in" as so used, signifying to embark in, take
part in, or enlist in, meaning substantially the same thing as to conspire.
SoDoMjY.
Glover v. State, Ind. 101 N. E. 529. Statement of Facts in Indictment. An
affidavit charging the crime of sodomy need not state the facts, it being suffi-
cient to follow the words of the statute; such crime being an exception to
Lurns Ann. St. 1908, Sec. 2040 (Acts 1905, c. 169, Sec. 169), providing that an
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indictment or affidavit must contain a statement of the -facts constituting the
offense charged.
WITNESSES.
People v. Van Zile, 141 N. Y. Supp. 168. Irnpeachment--"Conviction."
Where one accused of crime took the stand in his own behalf, and testified that
he had never before been convicted of crime, the fact that he had been in-
dicted and convicted by a jury could not be elicited to impeach his credibility,
where the conviction had been reversed on appeal; for the expression "convic-
tion" means a conviction pursuant to law, and upon reversal the erroneous con-
viction became a nullity, and accused was restored to the status of an innocent
man.
Recalling the Judiciary to Practical Administration- of Law-Public
opinion is gradually "recalling" our judiciary to a more practical administration
of the law. This is well illustrated in two recent federal decisions, Hyde v.
United States, 225 U. S., 347, and Brown v. United States, in the same volume,
page 392. Both involve the crime of conspiracy, and the question raised was
whether defendants could be tried in a state where overt acts had been com-
mitted, although the . conspiracy was formed in another jurisdiction.
The court divided five to four. The majority sustained convictions in the states
where the overt acts were committed. In the course of the opinion the fol-
lowing language was used, indicating the change of viewpoint as to the practical
administration of criminal law:
"It is not an oppression in the law to accept the place where an unlawful
purpose is attempted to be executed as the place of its punishment, and rather
conspirators be taken from their homes than the victims "and witnesses of the
conspiracy be taken from theirs. We must not, in too great solicitude for the
criminal, 'give him a kind of immunity from punishment because of the difficulty
in convicting him. '* * * The possibility of such a result repels the con-
.tention and demonstrates that to yield to it would carry technical rules and
rigidity of reasoning too far for the practical administration of criminal jus-
tice. * * * The constitution of the United States is not intended as a facil-
ity for crime."
A like attitude is shown in the recent decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the Eighth Circuit, McKinney v. United States of America:
There a motion was made to quash an indictment upon 'the ground
that no competent evidence was produced before the grand jury. The
trial court denied the motion, and its action is sustained. In the course of
the opinion, the following sensible view is expressed by Circuit Judge Hook:
"There is an unfortunate tendency in criminal jurisprudence to raise minor
matters to the dignity of substantial rights. The plain safeguards against gov-
ernmental and private oppression have become by judicial action so embedded in
non-essential additions and technical refinements that their true limitations are
not always clear, and it not infrequently happens that criminal trials become
mere adroit contests, in which substance yields to form and the search for truth
is diverted to and ends in collateral inquiries. Many an intelligent person, ac-
cused of crime, has been discharged for reasons so abstruse as to be beyond
his comprehension, and the triumph has not been of innocence, but of ingenuous
subtlety. Of course fundamental safeguards should not be frittered away, but
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the growth of judicial construction should also be with due regard to the just
rights of society and the practical conduct of trials."
Liaility of Militia for Acts Under Orders.-A decision determining the
civil liability of members of the militia for acts performed pursuant to orders
in actual service which critics say must tend to dishearten the militia and render
it inefficient was handed down by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in Franks
vs. Smith, in which the court held that the defendant militiamen made an
unjustifiable arrest and were liable for false imprisonment.
The state militia had been called out to quiet night riding, and a sergeant
and a number of privates were detailed by their captain to watch a certain high-
way at night, with orders if, during any unusual hour of the. night they
encountered men traveling the highway in numbers of more than two to halt
them, receive their explanation and, if- necessary, to search them, and if they
were found carrying concealed weapons to arrest and take them into camp.
About midnight defendant and his fellow soldiers encountered plaintiff and five
others traveling on the highway, and after halting and searching them found
pistols in the buggy of the plaintiff and one other of. the party. Pursuant to
orders they were arrested and taken to camp and the next day turned over to
the civil authorities on the unfounded charge of carrying concealed weapons.
The hearing failed to show that the plaintiff had theretofore committed or
was about to commit a public offense of any kind. The court accordingly held
that since the arrest was unjustifiable those participating in it were liable for
false imprisonment.
The court lays down the proposition of law. that members of the militia
when called out by the Governor to suppress a riot or insurrection are merely
peace officers, with no wider authority and subject to the same discretion as
peace officers. The court said:
"After mature consideration we have reached the conclusion that any mili-
tary order, whether it be given by the Governor of the state or an officer of
the militia or a civil officer of a city or county, that attempts to invest either
officer or private with authority in excess of that which may be exercised by
peace officers of the state is unreasonable and unlawful; and if it is obeyed
the officer or private giving obedience subjects himself to such punishment and
liability as the penal and civil laws of the state might inflict against a private
individual guilty of similar transgression of the law or rights of the citizen."
The Kentucky decision is contrary to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in Commonwealth vs. Shortall and the Supreme Court of Colorado in re Moyer.
The Shortall case proceeded on a different basis from the Kentucky case, which
is that when the Governor is obliged to call out the militia a state of "qualified
martial law" supervenes, and acts done by members of the militia pursuant to
orders which are required by or are reasonably suitable to the suspension of
civil conditions do not subject the doers to the ordinary civil liabilities.- In
that case it was held that a militiaman who was stationed to guard a residence
which, during'a time of rioting and disorder, had been dynamited and against
which threats had been made to repeat the offence, with orders to shoot any
persons found prowling about the house, was not guilty of a crime because
he shot a person who approached the building and refused to obey his command
to halt.
